Strategy: Iran (and N. Korea) May Explain Iraq
Rev. Joseph Lowery's WMD comment at the Coretta Scott King's funeral -- and the audience's applause at it -- bring up a question we keep coming back to: why Iraq?
Here's a possibility:
In the 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush identified Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as part of an "axis of evil." Of these, which of the three was weakest militarily? Which of these three could the U.S. attack with the least cost to our military and the in-country civilian population?
The answer to both is Iraq. Add to these Iraq's own role in fighting its way to the front of the line by
- defying numerous UN resolutions, leading up to November 2002's Resolution 1441.
- shooting at coalition planes over the no-fly zones
- subverting UN sanctions
- maniplulating the Oil-for-Food program, and
- loudly rattling its own sabers.
The peace-at-any-cost mob's cynical argument that the US should not have gone into Iraq because North Korea and Iran pose far greater threats only underscores the point: attacking either of these states, at least from the inevitably flawed vantage point the US had in 2003, would have had (and may yet have) far higher human, military, and political costs than overthrowing Saddam Hussein.
In short, perhaps the US calculated that a relatively easy victory in Iraq could remove Saddam AND accomplish two other key goals: (a) show rogue regimes worldwide that it meant business; and (b) avoid having to invade Iran and North Korea.
True, the victory has not come as easily as hoped. And Iran nor North Korea keep shaking their fists at the world, and especially the US. Still, from a strategic standpoint, given the information at hand at the time, the decision to go into Iraq -- assuming my speculation is right -- may not look all bad.